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The ''We Card'' program is the most ubiquitous tobacco industry ''youth smoking prevention'' program in the United States, and its retailer materials have been copied in other countries. The program's effectiveness has been questioned, but no previous studies have examined its development, goals, and uses from the tobacco industry's perspective.
On the basis of our analysis of tobacco industry documents released under the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, we concluded that the We Card program was undertaken for 2 primary purposes: to improve the tobacco industry's image and to reduce regulation and the enforcement of existing laws. Policymakers should be cautious about accepting industry selfregulation at face value, both because it redounds to the industry's benefit and because it is ineffective. (Am J Public Health. 2010;100: 1188-1201. doi:10.2105/AJPH.
2009.169573)
THE ''WE CARD'' PROGRAM IS the most widely used tobacco industry ''youth smoking prevention'' program in the United States. Its logo ( Figure 1 ) is visible on doors and windows of gas stations and convenience, grocery, and drug stores throughout the country. 1 Comparable programs have been developed in other nations. [2] [3] [4] Although the tobacco industry explicitly marketed tobacco to youth as late as the 1970s, 5, 6 today the industry says it agrees that tobacco should not be marketed to the legally underage [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] and claims that
We Card successfully reduces sales to youths. 1, 7, 12 Evidence on the effects of retailer ID checks, however, is mixed, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] and a systematic review concluded that retailer programs were the least effective intervention proposed to reduce tobacco use among youths. 20 Tobacco control advocates have debated whether youth access programs are worth pursuing, given that such programs' ''forbidden fruit'' messages are attractive to adolescents, [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] but no previous studies have examined We Card's development, uses, and goals. Economic theory predicts that industry self-regulation will achieve social benefits far smaller than those gained from government regulation, 28 although governments increasingly view self-regulation as a means to achieve public goals without public spending. 29 However, industries and governments may have competing agendas, suggesting that public health advocates should be wary of self-regulation strategies. We evaluated industry self-regulation in the context of public health by analyzing the development and uses of We Card. This program's success in reaching tobacco retailers and attracting independent allies has made We Card one of the tobacco industry's major public relations achievements. However, despite industry claims that the program is effective, internal industry evidence suggests that We Card has not reduced tobacco sales to minors and that it was not designed to do so. Instead, We Card was explicitly structured to improve the industry's public image and to thwart regulation and law enforcement activity.
METHODS
More than 50 million internal tobacco industry documents, released publicly as a result of the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement, are accessible online through the University of California, San Francisco, Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http:// legacy.library.ucsf.edu). 30 Be- 
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Billboard public service announcements expanded to nearly 1500 placements, 107 coalitions supporting With its reduced budget, in 1999 CRTR aimed to ''specify various promotional programs and efforts to include public official participation'' and ''increase media appeal,'' including continued use of public service announcements 48, 116 and other media.
117, 118 CRTR continued recruiting endorsements, [119] [120] [121] [122] but there were increasing demands Both CRTR and the We Card program were presented as quasiindependent entities that happened to enjoy tobacco industry support, rather than as the almost wholly owned industry subsidiaries they were. When CRTR's director was asked to provide information on We Card funding to a tobacco company government relations representative, he responded, ''On the funding question, we both know that the bulk of the funding is provided by TI [the Tobacco Institute]. That's not something that I advertise, nor discuss with anyone outside of the manufacturers and TI. The CRTR board knows it . . . but I'm reluctant to put that in writing for distribution'' [ellipsis in original]. Reduce tobacco regulation and the enforcement of existing tobacco control laws. The tobacco industry and retailers anticipated from the program's inception that We Card could be used to block stronger policies restricting youth access to tobacco. Industry surveys in 1996 found that retailers saw this as an excellent use of the program. 181 However, FDA regulators attempting to improve Synar compliance noted that retailers had no serious interest in using We Card to actually reduce tobacco sales to minors. One complained: ''As far as We Card goes, there's trouble with just placing signs and nothing more. Retailers think they've met their responsibility as soon as they post the signs. ' The Coalition later successfully solicited multiple police departments to participate in the ''It's Our Duty'' program, in which police officers distributed We Card promotions to retailers. [96] [97] [98] 183 By 1999, CRTR had developed enough positive publicity that it could use its contacts to advocate against tobacco control policies, insulating tobacco companies from the negative press coverage it feared when it acted alone. In its 1999 training and education plan, the coalition explained:
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In short, We Card training efforts helped gain the recognition of hundreds of elected officials on the local, state and federal levels through hundreds of positive news stories. Press reports citing We Card appear in major dailies (USA Today, LA Times), in many local newspapers and on television nationwide. State retail association executives continue to point to We Card training as evidence that further restrictions and taxes aren't necessary. 184 Soon, however, efforts to promote We Card as an alternative to other regulation began to draw negative attention. California had passed the Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement (STAKE) Act in 1995, which required that retailers post a notice including a telephone number to report to the state failures to check identification for tobacco purchases (Figure 1 shows a copy The issues raised by the attorney general suggested larger problems with We Card that would continue to be an issue in other states. [185] [186] [187] [188] 
DISCUSSION
Although We Card has been presented as a way to decrease tobacco sales to minors, we have shown that the program's goal is to undermine enforcement of existing laws, prevent passage of effective state legislation, establish the tobacco industry as a ''partner'' with state agencies, 191 and burnish the public images of tobacco companies and retailers. Despite extensive evidence suggesting that current retailer efforts to reduce tobacco sales to youths are inadequate, 18,20 tobacco companies continue to claim that reductions in smoking among youths are directly attributable to We Card.
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Our study provides strong support for theoretical claims that industry self-regulation fails to achieve socially desirable outcomes and may create socially undesirable ones. 28 The strategy of creating alliances with public health groups and law enforcement agencies could be interpreted as additional evidence that the strategies of Philip Morris's Project Sunrise, a 20-year plan aimed at rebuilding the company's image and dividing the tobacco control community, are still being executed. Those plans explicitly referenced youth access programs as fertile areas for ''partnerships'' aimed at ''creating schisms'' within tobacco control. 191 Groups genuinely interested in decreasing access to tobacco among youths, therefore, may wish to dissociate themselves from We Card and similar industrysponsored programs, both in the United States and internationally, and consider legislation that prohibits retailers from simultaneously using industry and governmental programs. 192 In supporting We
Card, these groups may unwittingly increase the tobacco industry's credibility 193 while compromising their own public health and law enforcement goals. Furthermore, article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control calls on governments worldwide to avoid partnering with the tobacco industry in tobacco control programs.
194
We Card and other similar industry programs are designed to suggest that tobacco companies are ''part of the solution'' to the problem of youths' tobacco use. In doing so, they also serve to reify ''youth tobacco use'' as the prevailing definition of the tobacco policy problem, distracting the public and policymakers from the fact that cigarettes remain the single most deadly consumer product ever made. We Card continues the tobacco industry's historical pattern of public deception in the interest of corporate self-preservation. j 
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